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Abstract 
This article explores legal consciousness through a consideration of the trust that 
workers extend to employment law to protect them, and how they react when their 
expectations are frustrated, tracing evolving legal dispositions and reflections upon 
the boundaries of legality. Clients of Citizens Advice Bureaux were case-tracked as 
they attempted to resolve work-related disputes. Generally participants trusted 
employment law to be there for them, rarely anticipating the limits and 
conditionality of various rights, or the considerable difficulties that can accompany 
their enforcement. Frustrated expectations were met with varying degrees of 
acceptance and fatalism, with the redirection of grievances towards collectivised 
dissent or activism being exceptionally rare. People tend to engage with 
employment law in ways that legitimate institutions and reaffirm a system that, for 
a variety of reasons, offers weak protection and enforcement.  
Key words 
Employment disputes; tribunals; false consciousness; legal consciousness; 
hegemony 
Resumen 
Este artículo explora la conciencia jurídica, y, para ello, toma en consideración la 
confianza que depositan los trabajadores en que la legislación laboral los proteja, y 
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cómo reaccionan cuando sus expectativas se ven frustradas, rastreando las 
disposiciones legales en desarrollo y sus reflejos sobre los límites de la legalidad. 
Se siguieron los casos de algunos clientes de las Oficinas de Asesoramiento a los 
Ciudadanos que intentaban solucionar conflictos laborales. En general, los 
participantes confiaban en que la ley del trabajo los protegiera, y rara vez preveían 
las limitaciones y condicionamientos de diversos derechos o las dificultades de su 
cumplimiento. Las expectativas frustradas generaban diversos grados de aceptación 
y fatalismo; la canalización de las quejas hacia la disensión colectiva o el activismo 
se daba de forma excepcionalmente rara. La gente tiende a comprometerse con la 
legislación laboral en formas que legitiman a las instituciones y que reafirman un 
sistema débil para ofrecer protección. 
Palabras clave 
Conflictos laborales; tribunales; falsa conciencia; conciencia jurídica; hegemonía 
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1. Introduction 
This article considers the trust individuals generally place in law to be there to 
protect them should a problem arise, despite the fact that this trust is often shown 
to be misplaced when they begin to examine or attempt to assert their rights. Our 
particular focus is on labour law and its application to individuals’ disputes at work 
through the UK’s employment tribunal (ET) system, although the theoretical basis 
could be applied to other legal areas. In this article we explore notions of 
hegemony, legal consciousness and false consciousness with the aim of enriching 
our understanding of how, by perpetuating structural inequalities, labour law 
through the system of employment protection rights constrains as well as enables 
actors in their attempts to resolve employment disputes. It examines what happens 
when people’s expectations are frustrated, either through the advice they are given 
or through their direct experience of attempting to use the law. Drawing on critical 
legal studies and legal consciousness literatures, the article considers the trust 
people place in the system of employment rights to protect them. The article 
analyses data from a large-scale research project which case-tracked clients of 
Citizens Advice Bureaux (CAB) as they attempted to resolve work-related disputes. 
This analysis demonstrates a shift in the legal consciousness of workers who seek 
legal solutions for a workplace problem; from a hopefulness that the law may 
provide some assistance to the realization that successfully utilizing the law is 
difficult and potentially beyond what they can achieve. It explores the range of 
responses and conceptions of law that result from individuals’ attempts to 
determine what counts as “legal” (Litowitz 2000, 548), with the most common 
reactions being cynicism or fatalism.  
The paper begins by setting out how false consciousness and hegemony are useful 
concepts in exploring the nature of public engagement with the law and identifies 
legal consciousness literature as bringing additional nuance to our understanding. 
This framework is useful in determining the uses (and non uses) of labour law. The 
paper then sets out the research design and methods used to collect the empirical 
data upon which the analysis draws. Findings are then presented which identify the 
vague notions that individuals coming to the CAB had of their employment rights 
before focusing on their reactions as their expectations were frustrated, as they 
learned what is or is not defined as legal, and the difficulties they experienced in 
attempting to use the highly legalistic world of the ET system. Employment law is 
more bounded than people imagine in terms of the limits of and qualifications for 
various rights, and traversing the boundaries of law in order to enter into the ET 
system as actors capable of utilising law and enforcing rights is generally far more 
difficult than anticipated. A concluding section argues that the way in which so 
called employment protection rights operate is, in fact, illustrative of law’s 
hegemony by which, in its current incarnation, it promises more than it is capable 
of delivering. 
2. False consciousness and the hegemony of law 
Although broadly associated with Marxism, the concept of false consciousness was 
not given extended consideration by Marx himself with his commentary in this 
context mostly drawn from Engels’s correspondence. Specific work on similar 
notions of ideological domination can be found in Gramsci’s prison notebooks 
(Gramsci 1999/1947) and latterly the Frankfurt School of sociology (Eyerman 1981, 
for a review). Engels (Marx and Engels Correspondence 1968/1893) wrote of “false 
consciousness” as an ideology that dominates the thinking of exploited groups, 
simultaneously justifying and perpetuating their exploitation, explaining why 
workers accepted rather than revolted against persistent inequality in society and 
the exploitation of labour by capital. Engels saw such cognitive distortion occurring 
through the manipulation of political - and juridical - ideologies. Writing at a time in 
which much of the optimism about the coming workers’ revolution had evaporated 
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in the light of historical developments, Gramsci (1999/1947) developed a more 
expansive explanation of how the state exerts control via ideology, manipulating 
cultural norms and values so that those of the elite appear as common sense. In 
endeavouring to promote Gramsci’s work to a wider audience of critical legal 
scholars, Litowitz (2000, 516) has drawn attention to Gramsci’s insights into “law’s 
ability to induce submission to a dominant worldview”.  
Gramsci viewed the state as deploying two kinds of power, one coercive (or 
physical) and the other ideological (or hegemonic). The state may coerce 
submissiveness via threats of restraint, imprisonment, violence or the confiscation 
of property. However, Gramsci’s main innovation was to theorise power exerted via 
ideological means. For him, false consciousness, defined as the unquestioned 
acceptance of existing arrangements and ideological explanations provided by the 
ruling class, makes hegemonic rule possible (Eyerman 1981, 47). Under this 
hypothesis, the status quo is internalised, forming “a ragtag and often contradictory 
set of basic beliefs and presuppositions that reflect the existing arrangement”, 
which are taken as inevitable and seemingly expected no matter how unequal or 
exploitative the outcomes that they produce are (Litowitz 2000, 528). 
To maintain its dominance and win the consent of the masses, the ruling class must 
periodically make alliances and strike compromises regarding its essentially narrow 
economic interests. Over time the ruling class develops hegemonic cultures tied to 
folklore, popular culture and religion which become embedded in the public 
consciousness and which enable its dominance to be perpetuated through its 
accommodation of certain demands (e.g. those of trade unions for minimum 
conditions). Through such accommodations, the form of hegemony evolves, giving 
the appearance of a system open to change. In fact any concessions ultimately 
serve to reinforce the dominance of the ruling class. In terms of resisting 
hegemony, Gramsci (1999/1947) saw the role of critical scholars in making those 
outside of the traditional intelligentsia challenge the status quo as part of the 
counter-hegemony. Importantly the working-class would also develop its own 
“organic intellectuals” (Gramsci 1999/1947).  
Gramsci’s work “provides a useful starting point for legal scholars who understand 
that domination is often subtle, invisible, and consensual” (Litowitz 2000, 519). 
Law’s dual functions, by which it can be both repressive and constitutive, mirror the 
two forms of state power, physical force and hegemony (Gramsci 1999/1947, 508-
509; Litowitz 2000, 530). Law’s repression is represented in the presence of police, 
prisons, courtrooms and the armed forced which can be used to thwart outbursts of 
social unrest (Litowitz 2000, 530). However, through law-making, the state also 
“has the power to authorize and legitimate—indeed, to produce—a set of social 
institutions and practices. That is, the law authorizes a particular arrangement by 
enabling a certain way of life” (Litowitz 2000, 530). Gramsci was an early advocate 
of this social constructionist position which has had a wide influence in the fields of 
politics and political communication, sociology and more recently socio-legal 
studies, primarily through the Frankfurt School’s development of the Critical Legal 
Studies movement (Litowitz 2000, 532).  
Litowitz argues that the law is hegemonic “by its very nature” because of its 
exclusivity - there is no alternative legal system so that an official code is imposed 
upon the affairs of individuals. Furthermore, law’s ability to act as an instrument of 
social construction gives it a world-making quality which is instrumentalised 
through the criminalization of certain activities and behaviours and legitimation of 
others” (Litowitz 2000, 546, drawing on Goodman 1978). Its paradigmatic nature 
enables it to define the realms of admissible problems, conflicts and grievances, 
“admit[ing] such puzzles as it is capable of solving (…) the existing legal system 
rules out incommensurate inquiries and claims, lending a superior (hegemonic) 
status to the existing concepts” (Litowitz 2000, 548). Through law’s 
conceptualisation and practical operation, “we face a code that is self-referring, 
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self-legitimating, and very difficult to subvert because it forms a closed system at 
any given time” (Litowitz 2000, 548). The apparently neutral code of law betrays a 
firm class affiliation in which appeals to fairness, freedom and equality are 
contested openly without really changing law’s substance, so that reforms merely 
“struggle to redefine the boundaries of what counts as legal” (Litowitz 2000, 548).  
2.1 The Fallibility of knowledge 
Deeming aspects of popular consciousness as false is contentious because of the 
suggestion of the existence of objectively true interests which people may be 
ignorant of. However, the notion of false consciousness need not imply that people 
are mere dupes. As social theory demonstrates, people may (re)construct social 
reality without full knowledge of the range of forces acting for and against their 
agency (see Archer 1998). It can be demonstrated empirically that lay-people 
frequently hold inaccurate understandings of the law and legal mechanisms, often 
in ways that act as barriers to justice and work against their agency thus further 
perpetuating structural disadvantages (e.g. Pleasance et al. 2015). Following in the 
lineage of Marx and then Gramsci, the Frankfurt School further developed 
conceptions of class consciousness and ideology, particularly focusing on more 
empirically-grounded research into subjective beliefs and behaviour (for a review 
see Eyerman 1981, Litowitz 2000). In the current context, workers may operate 
with variegated appreciation of their circumstances and the true sources of their 
grievance. Through comparison of differing responses to particular conditions, we 
may side-step the determination of consciousness as true or false; definitions of 
interests in a given scenario “cannot simply be true or false, though they can 
accord more or less comfortably with the reality of the situation” (Hyman 1972, 
125). Edwards (2006, 579) posits that comparative analysis: 
does not require us to say what the real interests of particular people might be. 
Instead, it is possible to analyse people similar in relevant respects and see how 
the same issues are handled. This offers up the opportunity to show what the 
different options are.  
Thus, analyses of consciousness and hegemony need to be approached with caution 
and subtlety, avoiding the supposition that theorists can discern the objectively true 
interests of those they research. Legal consciousness literature adds further nuance 
to this method of analysis in general and to our understanding of trust in the law in 
particular. 
3. Legal consciousness  
Building on the idea of law as an instrument of social construction which can be 
dominant or hegemonic through its very presence as well as in its practice, “legal 
consciousness” research explores how people not only tolerate the law but also 
actively embrace and uphold it (Ewick and Silbey 1998). Silbey (2005, 326) 
outlines the field’s core problematic as explaining why people display unrelenting 
trust in legal institutions, despite what appear to be “consistent distinctions 
between ideal and reality, law on the books and law in action, abstract formal 
equality and substantive, concrete material inequality”. 
Legal consciousness refers to more than knowledge or awareness of the law. It is 
not simply “an individual-level variable (how people think about the law)”, but 
refers to activity that contributes to the “construction of legality” (Silbey 2005, 
347). Legality is viewed as “an ongoing structure of social action” (Ewick and Silbey 
1998, 33–56), shaping the derivation of meaning, sources of authority, and cultural 
practices that are commonly recognized as “legal”. Legal consciousness research is 
concerned with “the ordinary, quotidian and, crucially, almost invisible life of law in 
society”, wherein conceptions of legality “structure and inform everyday thoughts 
and actions” (Halliday and Morgan 2013, 2). Equally as important as when and how 
law is used is when and why it is not, for example in circumstances where legal 
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intervention could effectively right an identifiable wrong but no relevant provision or 
mechanism exists (Silbey 2005, 326). 
Explanations of law’s resilience despite the persistent inequalities it produces 
abound. Some focus on an overarching myth of rights which reflect common ideals 
within society, while others stress the robustness of formal institutions in 
guaranteeing procedural justice regardless of substantive outcomes which enables 
the perpetuation of law’s legitimacy and domination (Silbey 2005, 336-8). Whether 
or not they truly inform or reflect law’s operation, ideals “such as open and 
accessible processes, rule-governed decision making, or similar cases being decided 
similarly (…) [are] part of the popularly shared understandings that shape and 
mobilize support for legal institutions” (Silbey 2005, 328). Merry (1990) has 
highlighted how government policy and accompanying rhetoric propagated by the 
civil court system itself shaped a particular view in the minds of working-class 
Americans. The courts promoted themselves as a system for the everyman, 
available for the problems of ordinary people, and encouraged engagement. In 
reality, the system was focused on diverting would-be litigants away from actual 
hearings and towards alternative methods of dispute resolution such as mediation. 
Likewise, the public aspirations of the ET system (originally Industrial Tribunals) in 
the UK are framed as providing “easily accessible, speedy, informal and 
inexpensive” justice for all (Donovan Commission 1968, 157). Yet the system can 
be experienced as legalistic, lengthy and intimidating (Busby and McDermont 
2012). Rather than questioning the legitimacy of law’s hegemony, users may 
rationalise frustrating personal experiences, distinguishing the specifics of their 
particular encounter with law from its general application by highlighting process-
based factors and their own role (if only they had obtained a lawyer/a better 
lawyer, run the case better, gathered more evidence) without questioning the 
operation or dominance of law itself. Such rationalisation serves to reinforce 
maintenance of law’s authority. 
In contrast to Gramsci’s largely top-down view of law as being imposed by powerful 
law-makers, Ewick and Silbey (1998, 17) have emphasised a bottom-up view of 
legality as “an emergent feature of social relations rather than an external 
apparatus”. Their emphasis on “legality” rather than “law” recognises the plurality 
of situations from which it emerges and the institutions it has shaped and adds 
nuance to Gramsci’s account of why power structures are so resilient. Notions of 
legality have an “internal complexity” (Silbey 2005, 350) so that we experience the 
law as simultaneously constraining and enabling, as frustrating and empowering. It 
is this complexity that allows the law to retain its hegemony so that it is rarely 
experienced as entirely disempowering. As Silbey (2005, 350) puts it: 
If legality were ideologically consistent, it would be quite fragile (…) if the only thing 
people knew about the law was its profane face of crafty lawyers and outrageous 
tort cases, it would be difficult to sustain the support necessary for legal authority. 
Conversely, a law unleavened by familiarity and even the cynicism familiarity 
breeds would in time become irrelevant. Either way—as solely god or entirely a 
gimmick—it would eventually self-destruct. 
For Halliday and Morgan (2013) much legal consciousness literature (e.g. Ewick and 
Silbey 1998), is overly focused on deferential, individualistic and fatalistic 
orientations to law resulting in pessimistic conclusions about public legal 
consciousness. They offer a more optimistic view, arguing that the focus on 
“disempowered resistance” (Ewick and Silbey 1998), overlooks the existence of 
legal cultures which, through collective agency or “dissenting collectivism”, attempt 
to change law’s power structures (Halliday and Morgan 2013, 13). They produce a 
typology of four legal cultures representing “key ‘narratives’ or characterizations of 
legality that may be invoked in making sense of everyday life” (Halliday and 
Morgan 2013, 11). They are: (I) deferential collectivism; (II) dissenting 
collectivism; (III) individualism; and (IV) isolation/fatalism. Dissenting collectives 
reject the legitimacy of official law and seek to exploit “the gaming potential of 
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state law”, “fuelled by a sense of a higher transcendent law above state law” 
(Halliday and Morgan 2013, 6). However, dissenting collectives are a fragile and 
usually temporary accomplishment as group members shift from towards fatalism 
or oscillate between positions, often becoming pessimistic that their efforts will ever 
bear fruit, leading to burn-out (Halliday and Morgan 2013, 22).  
3.1 Awareness of rights and legal consciousness in employment disputes  
Available evidence suggests that many people trust that there is a body of law to 
protect them should they require it, without anticipating the difficulties associated 
with attempting to use it. “[M]ost people have very little knowledge about the law 
itself and what they have is often inaccurate” (foreword to Genn 1999, p. V). A 
number of large-scale surveys have confirmed that awareness of civil law’s 
provisions and applications tend to be slight among the general public. Analysing 
data from the Civil and Social Justice Panel Surveys 2010 and 2012 (University 
College London Faculty of Laws 2015), Pleasance et al. (2015, III, 168) found a 
substantial knowledge and capability “deficit” in relation to the law in general, 
including employment law, which left individuals vulnerable to social exclusion and 
had a detrimental effect on access to justice. Individuals tend to be optimistic about 
the likelihood of a successful and just outcome where an identifiable right has been 
breached. Meager et al. (2002, 197) found that of economically active, working-age 
people they surveyed only 14.6% were not confident that they would obtain justice, 
52.2% were confident and 33% were not sure. 
Detailed knowledge of employment rights tends to be restricted to those with 
personal experience of attempting to utilise them so that legal disputes can be 
more difficult to resolve than people imagine. Awareness of specific rights is also 
generally higher among those to whom they apply, so that women and those aged 
between 26 and 45 are more knowledgeable about work-life balance legislation; the 
national minimum wage rate is known by lower-paid workers; disabled workers are 
more likely to be aware of disability discrimination provisions (Meager et al. 2002, 
XV). That those with experience of employment disputes tended to have a higher 
level of awareness of employment rights while being more modest about their 
knowledge suggests that understanding reveals more complexity than might have 
been supposed (Meager et al. 2002, 182). Likewise, Pleasance et al. (2015) found 
that experiencing a (general) problem which they attempted to resolve using legal 
means reduced an individual’s confidence about solving legal problems in the 
future.  
The process of formal employment dispute resolution in the UK presents some 
particular challenges. Critics of the system of employment protection law argue that 
it is imbalanced in favour of business interests rather than protection for workers 
(Heery 2011). “The state’s role in employment relations is far removed from that of 
a neutral, disinterested server. Rather, it is largely concerned with providing an 
environment which privileges the interests of employers” (Williams 2014, 71). The 
employment relationship is defined by an imbalance of power (Hyman 1972, 109). 
Through its legislative capacity, the state recognises this in seeking to provide 
employment protection for workers by laying down minimum statutory standards 
relating to pay and conditions including protection from unfair dismissal 
(Employment Rights Act 1996). Yet, while the UK’s framework of individual rights 
looks progressive and comprehensive on paper, weak enforcement mechanisms can 
severely undermine their effectiveness (Pollert 2007) making them “paper tigers, 
fierce in appearance but missing in tooth and claw” (Hepple 2003, 238). 
Dickens (2012) has defined the system of employment rights enforcement in the 
UK as “passive/reactive” due to its reliance on victims to complain with little 
proactivity required by employers. The system requires a high level of legal 
capability from individuals to understand and assert their rights in order to pursue 
claims and assumes that the ET system is accessible to the general public. In fact 
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formal dispute resolution rarely offers claimants the kind of remedies they seek (to 
remain in their jobs, or to receive an apology), and may also confound employers 
who may only learn about the law when they face an ET claim (Dickens 2012, 212). 
This retroactive, self-help approach “requires certain preconditions: awareness of 
rights; knowledge of how to enforce them; capacity to claim (including financial 
capacity) and willingness to do so” (Corby 2015, 174). In the UK, while state 
agencies monitor, inspect and enforce certain employment rights such as those 
relating to health and safety, the minimum wage, and equality duties, all other 
rights must be enforced by individuals (Dickens 2012). Such enforcement agencies 
are in any event under increasing budgetary pressure which has reduced the scope 
of their inspection activity (e.g. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 2016). 
While knowledge of rights appears to be on a need-to-know basis, those in low-
skilled, low-paid and precarious arrangements are likely to have the lowest levels of 
knowledge of employment rights overall (Pleasance et al. 2015). Greater overall 
awareness is found among managerial and professional workers, those in public 
administration, education and health and the business and financial services 
sectors, and among permanent employees and trade union members (Meager et al. 
2002, XIII). Furthermore, those with a relative “labour market advantage” or 
general social privilege (i.e. white/male/better qualified/white collar employees with 
permanent full-time jobs and written particulars of their terms and conditions), 
were more likely to have high knowledge and awareness of their rights. Such 
individuals are less likely to need to use such knowledge to enforce rights, being 
less likely generally to experience breaches (Meager et al. 2002, XV).  
Genn (1999) found that most people do not do take formal action to resolve 
disputes, including those that are work-related, which could potentially be 
considered legally actionable, or “justiciable”. Survey evidence suggests that the 
majority of problems at work do not become claims; rather, they lead to informal 
attempts at resolution within the workplace, voluntary exit or inaction (Pollert and 
Charlwood 2009). Casebourne et al. (2006) found that only 24% of those who 
experienced a problem at work put it in writing to their employer, while 3% made 
an ET claim. Once they look into utilising the ET system, people generally give up 
when they learn of law’s limits, difficulties and the forbidding nature of formal legal 
procedures; that is, when they meet the boundaries of law which they may have 
underestimated. 
Following a myriad of reforms, the accessibility of ETs has been eroded over several 
decades (Corby 2015). The location of ETs, the ease of making a claim and of 
having one accepted have all diminished since the system was introduced. The use 
of screening mechanisms, a mandatory requirement to register for Acas conciliation 
before submitting a claim, prehearings, the ability to require deposit orders from 
claimants, the rise in potential costs awards against claimants, the imposition of 
fees and the general move away from the use of panels comprising lay members at 
full hearings towards judges sitting alone have all made ETs less accessible. 
Furthermore, the increasing complexity of employment law makes it difficult for 
claimants and respondents to participate effectively in the ET system without 
representation. If they ever were, “ETs are no longer cheap, informal (given 
increasing legal complexity), or accessible with long claim forms replacing simple 
letters” (Corby 2015, 173). 
While the dominant political rhetoric has focused on the increasing litigiousness of 
worker-claimants (e.g. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills -BIS- 2011), 
a counter-critique of the system comes from those who view it as being 
increasingly stacked against workers- particularly those with limited education, or 
the funds to pay for representation (Busby and McDermont 2012, 2016, Dickens 
2012, Ewing and Hendy 2012, Renton 2012, Hepple 2013). Concerns over access to 
justice feed into a broader agenda of fairness at work, the extent of workplace 
voice for employees, and the broader degradation of work and conditions are also 
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relevant as is the curtailment of collective rights and demise of collective bargaining 
making it more difficult and costly to challenge work-related injustices. With only 
approximately half of the awards made by ETs ever received (BIS 2013), such weak 
enforcement may do little to deter employers from treating workers and employees 
badly (Saundry et al. 2014). 
4. Redefining Boundaries: Labour Law’s Hegemony at Work 
A more radical critique of employment law is that reliance on individual rights is 
part of the counter-mobilisation of labour, fragmenting conflict and diverting more 
radical challenges to workplace injustice as part of a subduing of trade union and 
class consciousness (see Bacon and Storey 1996, Pollert 2007, O’Sullivan et al. 
2015). The decline of trade unions is complex, involving multiple factors of which 
legal intervention is only one; also important are concomitant changes in the global 
economy, occupational structure, workplace size and failings of trade unions 
themselves (Kelly 1998). Yet, it would be remiss not to underline growing legal 
interventions that restrict collective action in tandem with the proliferation of rights 
that may offer worker protections (see Smith and Morton 1993). There is an 
argument that people have become increasingly reliant on the myth of individual 
rights as insurance should a problem occur at work, i.e. “legal enactment” rather 
than the “mutual insurance” of trade unionism (Webb and Webb 1897) and conduct 
themselves accordingly, for example not joining a trade union until a problem 
arises.  
If there is an increasing tendency for people to expect that the law will be there for 
them if something they perceive as unfair happens, such beliefs may prevent 
workers from taking alternative actions such as trade union membership. Corby and 
Latreille (2012, 388) argue that “legal norms have superseded industrial relations 
norms and values”. This means that individual dispute resolution may act as a 
substitute for collective action through union membership (McLoughlin and Gourlay 
1990) so that, “if a problem arises my employer will attempt to resolve it amicably 
with me”. Likewise, the imagined assertion of rights may have this substitution 
effect, “if a problem arises I can take it to an employment tribunal where my 
employer will be forced to resolve it or face a penalty”. Colling’s research into trade 
unions’ use of “legal mobilisation” (Colling 2009) suggested that the framing of 
disputes as relating to individual rights need not be in contest with more traditional 
collective action, but that this does in practice occur. Despite policy controversy, 
our understanding of how notions of legality structures thinking in relation to 
employment relations, and disputes in particular, is limited. However, there is some 
common ground between proponents of tighter employment regulation and those 
who support deregulation (see Heery 2010) based on the shared understanding 
that individuals may harbour illusions about their legal protections and 
entitlements. According to Pleasance et al. (2015, III) people do hold “erroneous 
beliefs” about the law distinct from “legal reality”. Public perceptions of legality are 
based on social norms and cultural values and are slow and difficult to change. 
From such a perspective, it might be argued that workers have been encouraged by 
successive governments to place their trust in individual rights as providing 
adequate employment protection.  
We see the repressive power of the state being exercised through law in the 
policing of strikes and demonstrations, with the extension of potential legal 
intervention in the Trade Union Act 2016, and through the use of armed forces to 
substitute for striking workers, for example during fire-fighters strikes. The 
hegemonic nature of labour law is seen in the authorisation or legitimation of 
certain practices as legal through accommodating measures, such as the ban on 
exclusivity clauses in zero-hours contracts rather than the full ban that many 
campaigners are seeking (UK Parliament 2015). Policy papers trumpet the 
openness and accessibility of the ET system to all (BIS 2011). The nature and 
extent of employment rights are openly contested without really changing law’s 
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substance, so that reforms merely “struggle to redefine the boundaries of what 
counts as legal” (Litowitz 2000, 548). One example of this arises through the 
setting of the qualifying period for unfair dismissal which has become a political 
football, having been changed from two to one years’ continuous service and back 
again in recent years with profound effects on many workers’ access to secure 
employment. Some radical changes to the system have gone largely un-debated - 
fees for claimants (although withdrawn following a Supreme Court ruling) were 
imposed after a short and arguably pointless consultation in which opposition to 
them was largely ignored (Dickens 2014, 242). 
Despite the difficulties inherent in utilising the current system, individuals are 
enabled by employment protection law as well as constrained. In the present study, 
on which this article will now focus, some participants had success in using the law, 
however, this often fell short of what they had always trusted and expected would 
be there for them in times of need. The following analysis will thus explore in more 
depth how individuals react when they learn the limits of employment protection 
law and how this influences their further interactions with law.  
5. Research design and methodology 
Data are drawn from a large-scale research project that case-tracked 158 workers 
as they attempted to seek justice for work-related grievances between late 2012 
and the end of 2014. Participants were recruited via Citizens Advice Bureaux (CAB), 
access points to those most likely to face the greatest barriers to justice, who 
cannot easily afford a lawyer or access trade union assistance. For such individuals, 
often subject to precarious working arrangements and low pay, the avenue to an ET 
claim is increasingly important given the decline of collective routes to dispute 
resolution. It is notable that during the period of data collection, radical reforms to 
the system were imposed including the extension of the qualifying period for 
protection from unfair dismissal from one to two years in 2012, and, in 2013 the 
introduction of fees for claimants to submit claims and to have them heard.1 Both 
reforms restrict access to justice, so that the data were collected in a time of 
change and turmoil making frustrated expectations and disappointment even more 
likely. 
The project is unique in providing longitudinal, qualitative data on experiences of 
the ET, from the early formulation of problems or disputes into legal issues, 
through submission of a claim, to hearing and beyond. In the following analysis we 
are particularly concerned with the trust individuals invest in the law to protect 
them and the ways in which they respond when expectations are frustrated. 
6. Findings 
6.1. Legal Consciousness in Employment Disputes 
In studying popular consciousness we typically “become aware of its illusions” 
(Sayer 1992, 39). To varying degrees participants in this study learned, through 
advice as well as through direct experience, that the process of making an ET claim 
                                                 
1 Fees of up to £1200 were imposed in July of 2013 but have since been ruled as unlawful by the 
Supreme Court as a result of a judicial review brought by the trade union Unison; see R (on the 
application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) [2017]. Following their introduction 
which led to a dramatic fall in the number of claims brought, fees have been the subject of considerable 
controversy with parliamentary reviews focusing on their impact on access to justice. The Government 
continued to endorse fees, arguing that “while it is clear that many people have chosen not to bring 
claims to the Employment Tribunals, there is nothing to suggest they have been prevented from doing 
so” (Ministry of Justice 2017, 3). The lack of evidence to support this assertion was contested, and it was 
argued that an impossibly high standard was being set to demonstrate the impact of fees on the 
behaviour of actual and potential claimants (for critiques see Busby 2015 and Kirk 2017). The Supreme 
Court’s judgment has led to the immediate removal of fees for claimants in Scotland, England and Wales 
with refunds available for those who have already paid them.  
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was more difficult than they had imagined or their rights more limited, even where 
they had some degree of success. When problems arise at work, individuals 
suddenly find themselves having to venture into the highly legalistic world of the ET 
system. As Ewick and Silbey (1998, 15) observed regarding law in general, few 
participants had given detailed thought to employment law or the legal nature of 
their working arrangements until a problem arose. Participants generally held 
vague notions of what was right, which were not necessarily based on what was 
legal. One participant commented: “I think that common sense would say that 
disabled people are protected, that they have to be. I didn’t know that much about 
it, I just knew that there was [sic] things in place to protect you”. The limits of law 
are only acknowledged and understood once individuals attempt to use it, with the 
majority of those giving up before formalising their disputes, and others learning 
through experience how difficult it is to chase an outcome that too often is 
ultimately disappointing.  
6.1.1. Learning the limits of law 
Citizens Advice and similar organisations participate in the construction of legality, 
“purposely, explicitly, and self-reflexively developing forms of legal consciousness” 
(Silbey 2005, 357). The cultural dispositions of individual CAB advisers may also 
vary significantly and change over time. As a non-political organisation, CAB do not 
seek to radicalise their clients, though they may encourage more or less strategic 
engagement with the law where they feel that it is weak or lacking. Like the divorce 
lawyers in the study by Sarat and Felstiner (1995), CAB advisers “negotiate 
realism” with clients, explaining that the law is often perverse, unfair, uneven, 
judges capricious and emphasising the need for insider knowledge and tactical 
engagement with it. Felstiner and Sarat’s client-participants tended to react to this 
initially with disbelief, suspicion and resistance followed by grudging acceptance. 
Lawyers’ encouragement of their clients’ willingness to settle rather than to go to 
full hearing was often met with ambivalence. Clients “resist the power that lawyers 
seek to exercise” (Sarat and Felstiner 1995, 139).  
In the current study participants would often fail to distinguish in any conscious 
sense the differences between the civil and criminal justice systems. Thus, while 
Veronika, a Lithuanian migrant, might have had particular difficulties expressing her 
thought-processes in English, it is nonetheless significant that her first thought 
when she was attempting to force her employer to pay owed wages was to tell her 
employer, “I want my money and if you don't give it to me I will go to the police” 
(as recounted to an adviser). In such situations, advisers are tasked with instilling 
realism about the nature of ETs and their remedies. 
CAB advisers manage the expectations (and emotions) of clients who may well 
have legitimate grievances against their employers which may only be partially 
redressed in the (uncertain) event of a successful ET claim. The recent changes to 
the qualifying period for unfair dismissal protection and imposition of ET fees 
alongside cuts to legal aid mean that there may be little positive advice to offer. A 
CAB adviser explained the tensions of advice giving in the context of austerity: 
The tears in people’s eyes when you tell them that the law is no good to them (…). 
‘But that’s not fair’. You’re darn right it’s not! (…) [A] lot of my conversations to do 
with employment law are negative (…) you have to tell them what the hurdles are 
going to be.  
A bureau manager echoed this sentiment, suggesting the difficulties for advisers 
being the bearers of bad news: 
With the cuts, you know, we get the brunt of it (…) we’re the messenger [that] gets 
shot. 
One adviser, discussing fees in particular felt constrained in how she could help 
clients: 
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You’re meeting people and you can’t help (…) basically there’s very little that you 
can do (…) you almost feel a bit de-skilled (…) you’re not doing what you want to 
do, or what you feel you should be doing.  
6.1.2. Types of disappointment 
Advisers and participants explained the various types of disappointment individuals 
experience when receiving employment advice or through attempting to use the 
law. Examples include finding that the law does not conform with common sense 
ideals or what is considered natural justice, that rights are more limited and 
qualified than expected, how long and time consuming making a claim will be, how 
hard it will be to prove the truth to an ET and that there will be more work to 
enforce any successful award which may never be paid. Individuals sought advice 
from CAB about whether their employers’ behavior was illegal, yet often ended up 
“being the loser, because the employer has the backing of the law” (migrant, 
male). One bureau manager succinctly articulated the divergence between common 
understandings of protections provided by employment law and “legal reality”.  
As always, people who don’t understand the law have a difficult time understanding 
what is fair and just what the law actually can deliver. 
Both client-participants and advisers referred to what they saw as the limited 
protection of employment rights as unjust. Cases that did not progress to the ET 
often involved circumstances that, while appearing to be unfair, were either not 
strictly illegal or difficult to provide evidence for. Client-participants learned of the 
limits, restrictions and qualifications around most employment rights (Ewing, 
2011). 
Advisers often sympathised but had to inform clients that bringing a successful 
claim over common problems like bullying by management is very difficult because 
of the particular way that the law operates in this respect: 
There’s nothing you can do about that, it seems, it wouldn’t stand up (…). I’ve seen 
a lot of general ‘picking on me’ stuff that really upsets people (…) it sounds awful, 
and then I’ve got to turn it to people and say, ‘look, employment law is (…) 
[limited]. (Volunteer generalist adviser) 
Advisers can only legitimately encourage clients to raise those aspects of their 
complaints which are demonstrable, and clearly covered by legal jurisdictions: 
Have you had any unpaid wages? Or are you being paid the minimum wage? (…) 
These are the things you can claim for here. Have you got anything that fits into 
these categories?’ (…) [T]here’s nothing you can really do for being just picked on. 
(Volunteer generalist adviser) 
CAB advisers undoubtedly face constraints relating to available resources which will 
have an influence on the cases that they can support or represent with claimants 
increasingly acting as litigants in person. With the advent of fees, advisers are likely 
to spell out the risks associated with pursuing more complex cases and to focus on 
the more straightforward cases which have a higher chance of success. Better 
resourced claimants will have more opportunity to pursue cases requiring complex 
legal argument or detailed evidence such as discrimination and/or dismissal cases 
involving bullying or harassment.  
Ideas of the force of the law, such as assumptions that the law would prevent an 
employer from doing something, would often later be rationalised down towards at 
least stopping the employer mistreating others in the future, recognising the 
reactive nature of employment law. Thus, expectations of the law are downgraded 
as people meet obstacles in their paths to justice, or are advised of the limits by 
advisers. 
Client-participants also appeared unprepared for how long ET claims would take to 
be heard. Some referred to the span of the dispute as “that tribunal chapter in my 
life” (Davide), where their “life was preparing for the tribunal” (Bridgette). This 
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whose cases went to full hearing were frequently shocked at how long, formal, 
legalistic and generally difficult they found the hearing to be. Many of those who 
made awards were in disbelief that they had to do more work to enforce them. 
Grant, a telemarketer who had won a default judgment when his employer 
disappeared owing him several weeks’ wages, was shocked at how much work and 
expense was involved in tracking down the employer and enforcing payment. Grant 
was struggling financially and:  
Had to put it on the back burner for a while (…). I’ll try and get I’ll see what the 
next step is and how much it’s going to cost (…). I’d really need to think about it, 
throwing good money after bad. 
6.2. Reacting to and reflecting upon frustrated expectations of employment law 
The legal consciousness literature reminds us that people do not only construe 
legalities and act accordingly, but they also participate in their (re)construction, 
with potential for deconstruction (Ewick and Silbey 1998, Silbey 2005). Participants 
in the current study tended to react to their disappointment with law with 
resignation rather than radical rejection so that a system that is perceived and 
experienced as unjust goes unchallenged and is reproduced rather than 
transformed (Archer 1998). Even those participants who achieved a satisfactory 
outcome still experienced the law as quite different to the vague ideas they 
previously held. Generally they learned that it was much more complicated and 
involved a great deal of effort on their part. In the following sections we provide 
specific examples of how people responded to frustrated expectations, charting 
evolving legal consciousness.  
Those who had a clearly successful outcome sometimes felt “empowered” (Cheryl) 
by their experience. Pauline, whose employer settled her case as soon as an ET 
claim was submitted, spoke of standing up for her rights in future and advising a 
colleague on his rights when she felt he was facing discrimination. However, most 
participants faced at least some frustrations and constraints in their attempts to use 
law, while experiencing enablement to a degree, but usually not to the extent that 
they desired or expected. As well as success in litigation, enablement can relate to 
more subtle wins such as simply being given a say in what is perceived as a neutral 
venue. Constraints related to the near impenetrability of employment law due to its 
complexity, the disparity between workers’ and their employers’ abilities to pay for 
legal representation to help participate as a competent actor. Thus, Bridgette, a 
financial administrator who represented herself in her unfair dismissal claim 
reflected upon how her conception of legality was shaped by the outcome of her 
case. She might have felt differently had the difficulties she encountered proved 
insurmountable. Throughout the process, which lasted for a year, Bridgette was 
often unsure which way her case would go. However, the experience of self-
representing appears to have empowered her. “Whether I win or lose I’m so glad I 
went ahead and all the stress has been worth it”, she said, “because I got a chance 
to be treated equally. I actually spoke up for myself. I questioned why they had 
done certain things”. Bridgette was successful and reflected on the legal system: 
“Well, obviously I have faith in it because it works (…) but I’d have a different thing 
to say if I hadn’t won”. 
As individuals’ assumptions about law are tested through direct experience or in 
relation to the advice they receive, their differing responses build from and 
augment their orientations to law illustrating a plurality of legal cultures (Halliday 
and Morgan 2013). Through their attendance at the CAB participants were 
generally hopeful that the law may be able to provide them with some protection, 
at least early on in their dispute. There was evidence of variations in cultural biases 
among participants, so that those with backgrounds in trade unionism and radical 
politics were more likely to display greater degrees of dissenting collectivism than 
others from the outset. This chimes with Colling’s findings that a rejection of state 
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law, reference to a transcendental law and “gaming” approaches were evident 
among trade unionists when attempting to engage in “legal mobilisation” (Colling 
2009).  
Responses to frustrated expectations were quite diverse, ranging from acceptance 
of the law’s position and localized rationalization of disappointments, through 
cynicism and plans to avoid reliance on employment law in future, towards outright 
dissenting collectivism, as articulated by the “radical activists” identified by Halliday 
and Morgan (2013). Such moments may be critical junctures in legal 
consciousness, a fork in the road where individuals rationalise some fault in the 
law, perhaps localising it as a minor glitch - something overlooked by the legal 
system - continuing with their faith in the law, whereas others turn away towards a 
more serious rejection of the law as being useful to them in line with notions of 
fatalism or with dissenting collectivism (Halliday and Morgan 2013). 
6.3. Framing the Data 
Following frustrating encounters with employment law, most participants showed 
irritation, dissonance, and cynicism towards the law while retaining their ultimate 
admiration for labour law’s legitimacy and centrality to orderly relations and 
fairness, albeit with lowered expectations. In the following section four types of 
reaction are identified with illustrations from the data provided. These mirror 
Halliday and Morgan’s dispositions towards law, i.e. individualism, isolation, 
deferential and dissenting collectivism (Halliday and Morgan 2013). The residuals 
will be explained in discussion below. The four reactions to a negative experience 
are: 
1. Acceptance and self-discipline, attributable to their own dumb luck so that 
the individual would avoid having to rely upon the law again, maintaining 
belief in the authority of law, and largely blaming themselves for failure to 
play within its rules;  
2. Cynicism, where frustration with and dissonance from the law remained 
individualized and agency-negating;  
3. Collectivized dissent combined with fatalism; and 
4. Collectivized dissent combined with agency/planned attempt to bypass the 
law through. This was the rarest reaction - a radical rejection of employment 
law’s value to the individual who prepared themselves to take alternative, 
more radical action immediately or in the longer-term to improve their lots.  
The range of responses is discussed below using vignettes selected to exemplify 
each reactive disposition. The latter two dispositions are handled together, 
reflecting the way in which dissenting collectivism tends to be a rare oscillation 
from its more deferential form. 
6.3.1. Acceptance and self-discipline: maintaining law’s authority 
Helen was working as a care assistant in a private care home for around a year 
before she was dismissed for airing a complaint about her employer on social 
media. Helen did not deny her wrongdoing but felt that her dismissal was overly 
harsh and handled poorly. However, at the CAB she sought simply to raise issues of 
owed wages, holiday pay and questioned some unauthorised deductions. The CAB-
affiliated solicitor she saw reviewed her case and advised her to submit an ET claim 
for around £850. The solicitor submitted the claim on Helen’s behalf. However, for 
reasons Helen did not fully understand, the solicitor later withdrew her case: 
Its been all cancelled due to the other party wanting me to pay there [sic] lawyers 
if I loose [sic] my case spoke with my lawyer a week ago and not herd [sic] 
anything back so I take it that its been cancelled completely now. (Text message) 
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During the phone call, the solicitor told her: “Well it’s up to yourself,” he says, “but 
really,” he says, “I wouldn’t go for it”. Helen did not understand why the lawyer 
was advising she drop it and felt some resentment because of this: 
I thought I was very unfairly treated (…) when I got the letter in stating that I was 
having to pay for their lawyer if I didn't win the tribunal you know and it made me 
very, very angry (…) Mr [name of CAB solicitor], he more or less said well look let’s 
just forget this you know what I mean, because I mean it was eight hundred and 
odd pounds you’re looking for. 
Helen did not feel willing or able to question or challenge her representative’s 
recommendation after he put it in writing; he “more or less put this down on paper 
you either accept it or you don't accept it”. Helen had initially felt that the way that 
she had been dismissed arbitrarily by her employer was unfair but had let that 
slide. Now she would not even get the chance to claim the wages she was owed.  
Following the dispute, Helen was unemployed (receiving benefits) for around a 
year. She then worked for a short-spell in a temporary assembly-line job. Later, 
she obtained a job on a zero-hours contract with an agency providing care work 
which she was very grateful for. When asked if there were any lessons she had 
learned from her experience, Helen felt that she was more likely to “mind her P’s 
and Q’s” now to avoid getting into trouble again with an employer. The dispute had 
not however made her more attentive to her employment rights, or likely to find 
out about employer’s policies: 
Well working with this agency right now, I mean I’m no’ too thingmied up on their 
laws do you know what I mean I’ve no’ actually read into a’ that stuff. I mean they 
usually send us out things you know like different things. 
Most participants were not quite as deferential as Helen. The majority grew more 
cynical through their attempts to use law, either learning how to use it more 
cleverly in future or finding ways to avoid it altogether. Preeti, a care worker, was 
very disappointed that legal procedures did not conform to her conception of 
substantive fairness. Preeti had been disciplined for fighting at work with a 
colleague, although she felt bullied by the colleague and had finally snapped. Preeti 
wanted her disciplinary record wiped clean. However, her employer countered that 
she had not formally lodged a complaint about bullying. Responding to advice that 
her employer seemed to have acted reasonably in their handling of the situation, 
Preeti said: “According to me, it doesn’t matter that they followed the right 
procedure, but whether they have been fair”. Preeti felt let down by the legal 
protection for her situation but resolved to engage with law more skillfully if 
another problem arose:  
That’s a really good learning for me you know. In future if I’ll do any kind of thing, 
you know, if I’m doing any complaint or anything I have to sign the paper and give 
(…) a written statement for my manager like, ‘yeah, I informed you’. 
Preeti felt let down by the law, but did not dwell on its systemic effects. Even where 
participants developed more cynical orientations to law, and its usefulness to them 
in future, there was a widespread tendency to see this as immutable, rationalised 
as just “the way things have to be”.  
6.3.2. Cynicism  
Frustrating experiences with law sometimes led to cynicism about employment 
law’s usefulness in general. Some participants spoke in individualistic terms of self-
reliance as a result of finding the law unhelpful in resolving an employment dispute. 
After being made redundant, Sandy, a middle manager, came to the CAB for help 
reviewing a compromise agreement from “somebody with a bit more legalese”. 
Sandy closed his correspondence with a researcher with the following:  
PS – a tip from my experiences, look after N[umber] One because when it comes 
down to the crunch there is no-one but you looking after your best interests. 
(Email) 
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Sandy felt his selection for redundancy was unfair but had not found the law useful 
in contesting it. He felt he had no evidence that he was a good performer or any 
way of measuring the relative performance of others which would have enabled him 
to build a case. He explained that he was not disputing his redundancy, only 
ensuring he was getting the best package, as there was “no smoking gun” to show 
that he has been wronged or by whom. He would no longer expect the behaviour of 
others to correspond to a code of ethics he had subscribed to. 
A related form of rejection of the legitimacy of law can lead to attempts to avoid 
relying upon it in the future by seeking self-employment. Graham, a leisure 
attendant was dismissed after a colleague had made an allegation against him 
which Graham said was false and that there was little evidence to support it. 
Graham raised an unfair dismissal claim and was surprised by the limited protection 
offered by employment law in relation to his particular situation and the difficulty of 
the ET process.  
[I] looked into all the black and white part of it and there’s actually no law that, the 
law gives works the right to do an investigation, they gave it their own law basically 
(…). I could not believe that and I was like that’s like letting anybody step over 
anybody they want so if you’re a boss you can just step over somebody if you really 
wanted to. 
Graham had lost trust in employers completely and planned to be self-employed 
from now on: “I don't really feel like I want to work for somebody (…). I don't have 
to worry about answering to somebody now”. Although Graham did not want to be 
part of an employment relationship that left him so vulnerable to abuse, his 
rejection did not lead him to any form of radical action in opposing employment law 
but rather escapism, a retreat from law.  
6.3.3. Between deferential and dissenting collectivism 
Deferential and dissenting collectivism to employment law was more obviously 
separated here in deed than thought, and as Halliday and Morgan (2013, 22) note, 
oscillation between acceptance and rejection of the law or aspects of it were 
common, often in concert with partners and families who were advising and 
assisting participants in decision-making. Sally and her husband were disappointed 
by the outcome of Sally’s ET claim, but felt worn down by the stress of the dispute. 
Sally had accepted a settlement which secured a fair reference but later regretted 
as she saw it, “letting the employer away with it”. Sally and her husband spoke 
scathingly about employment law, the incumbent government and the state 
generally, attitudes which had severely hardened following their let down by the 
dispute, and learning of reforms of the ET system (e.g. the imposition of fees).  
Sally’s employers changed her hours of work, stipulating that she must begin to 
work evenings and weekends. This was difficult for Sally to balance with her 
daughter’s care. Eventually, the employer sacked her for allegedly lying about her 
circumstances (which Sally denies). Sally recalled her CAB adviser as saying: 
Government is on the side of the employer, not the employee, so basically (…) they 
were within their rights to make me redundant or sack me or whatever (…). I 
couldn’t afford to not have a job (…). The employee has got no rights whatsoever 
when they’re working, and I think that’s wrong. 
In Sally’s view, the law favoured employer interests, and she displayed a critical 
class-based consciousness: 
The law isn’t there for the everyday person. They don’t, they don’t care about the 
everyday person. As long as you’ve got money and they’re getting’ tax money off of 
you, they don’t care about you as a person. You’re just a number. I think they care 
more about their prisoners than the working class. For the amount of things 
prisoners get, for breaking the law, yet the working class are getting punished 
every single turn. 
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Nevertheless, when asked about recent reforms to the ET system such as the 
charging of fees, Sally’s partner, who attended all her advice appointments and 
helped her take decisions regarding the dispute, articulated more deferential 
sentiments towards law, even though the couple had struggled with the claim, and 
were struggling financially. He suggested that government had to bring in fees to 
discourage weak and vexatious claims: 
I know, I know why they’ve done it is to stop a lot of people just wasting time on 
frivolous [complaints]- ‘well I’m just gonna do it to get up your nose’. 
Thus the couple jointly expressed a mixture of beliefs that pointed to class-based 
inequalities on the one hand, but resignation about “the way things have to be” on 
the other. 
Traces of “dissenting collectivism” were rare in the sample. Richard, a forklift driver 
provided the only obvious example of someone who responded to the failings of law 
to resolve an employment dispute with any kind of attempt at collective action.2 
Richard’s employer had attempted to make a number of unilateral changes to 
employees’ terms and conditions, such as reducing hours and changing the nature 
of the job resulting in a pay cut. At least ten workers were directly affected. Richard 
was vocal in his opposition, and soon found himself on the receiving end of 
unfavourable treatment and intimidation. He sought to organize a trade union in 
the workplace but found his colleagues fearful of victimization. Indeed, Richard was 
certain that his more recent ill-treatment by his employer was the result of him 
attempting to stand up for his rights, and to organize the workforce: “The problem 
is I’m standing up for myself”. Certain managers were aggressively anti-union and 
threatened to move the plant if workers organised. Richard was fairly certain that 
his employer “can’t do this”. He told the manager this and he said, “I can do what I 
like”. Other drivers had put grievances in about this manager in the past and the 
way he treated staff. After coming to a CAB and finding that his understanding of 
the law was not entirely correct, Richard spoke with disdain of so-called 
employment protection law and sought to redouble his efforts to organise his 
colleagues. He had organised a meeting in a pub but only six people showed up. It 
was unclear what happened next and whether Richard was successful in organizing 
a union. He had not returned to the CAB several months on and lost contact with 
the research project. 
In the more common scenario of dissenting collectivism oscillating with fatalism 
(Halliday and Morgan 2013, 22), a combination of the sheer difficulty in organising 
alternative forms of action, weighted against additional ties and responsibilities 
such as dependents and general subsistence. Grant had grown increasingly cynical 
of law. His firm belief in the “mutual insurance” of trade unionism (Webb and Webb 
1897) as the most effective means of protection was overridden by the difficulties 
of organizing in the contemporary workplace. Grant was sceptical about law and the 
“establishment” including the ET system and Acas. Since 2014 claimants to the ET 
have been required to notify Acas so that Early Conciliation can be attempted. Acas 
also offers an arbitration service and advice on individual and collective disputes as 
well as providing an approved code of practice on disciplinary and grievance 
procedures. Grant went as far in his critique in suggesting that the role of Acas was 
to tie-up claimants and to discourage them from going forward: 
The tribunal contacted Acas and it’s as if you know like somebody brings up this to 
the tribunal and the tribunal sort of kicks it into the long grass, ‘Acas can you do 
something with this?’ 
Grant’s suspicion was that Acas had been created by the business lobby or right-
wing interests to moderate or suppress trade unions: 
                                                 
2 Lesley, a school teacher, did ask a researcher for advice on if there was anything she might do to 
collectively but had not taken any action at the close of research. 
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I don't know who set up Acas in the first place? (…) [I]t was business wasn't it? (…) 
Probably it was a thing that was maybe forced on to the unions well I’ll tell you 
what you’re going on strike all the time what we’ll do is we’ll get an arbitrator in 
Acas and that’s probably how it came about. 
Grant felt that unionism and collective action were not only legitimate means of 
interest expression but perhaps the only viable means of holding employers to 
account: 
At the end of the day what else has a worker got to do but withdraw their labour 
there’s nothing else you can do, going back to the old days but it would be 
withdrawing your labour and it’s like a total no-no. 
However, having been displaced from a public sector job (in which he was a union 
representative) towards the now dominant non-union service sector (the job in 
which the dispute arose was a call-centre position in business-to-business 
marketing), Grant saw little prospect for collective action to resolve problems he 
faced like arbitrary dismissal/redundancy or unpaid wages.  
Similarly, Jack strongly supported unionism and felt that his unfair dismissal had 
resulted from him trying to uphold collective interests in health and safety and that 
formally organised collectivism was unfeasible in his present world of work. Jack 
has been working as a scaffolder before being dismissed. On learning that he did 
not have sufficient qualifying service to claim unfair dismissal, Jack described how 
bosses in construction always treated workers “like animals”. On hearing that there 
had been a recent change of law extending the qualifying period from one year to 
two, Jack said that this was just another example of “government giving them 
[employers] their own way again”. However, being advised that that he would 
probably only get a week’s notice pay, he felt that pursuing this was not worth the 
hassle. Jack was critical if not hostile towards government. He nonetheless 
developed cynicism rather than activism in response. When asked if he had ever 
been part of a union or would consider it in future, Jack said that he should have 
been, looking back but he had not taken a great interest or believed he would need 
protecting. He said that he would now most likely get some kind of “phone-job” 
(“the easiest to get”), but one in which the likelihood of being part of a workplace 
union was slim.  
Ray, a maintenance technician, was asked, following his unsuccessful claim for 
unfair dismissal, how he perceived employment law. He replied, “Ma reflections is 
[sic] that I was let down”. While he spoke of class-based inequalities and how they 
system worked against the “working man” (sic), approaching retirement age he 
seemed resolved to avoid having to rely on employment law. Traces of a radical 
rejection of law in Ray’s case were tempered by absorption into economic and life-
cycle considerations, e.g. proximity to retirement in this case. 
What of other participants, who displayed traces of rejection of law’s legitimacy but 
did not have retirement, marriage, a mortgage or childrearing to blame as 
dampeners to their radical fire? 
6.4. Rationalising localised inequalities while upholding employment law’s 
ultimate legitimacy 
Work in the legal consciousness tradition has stressed the complexity of perceptions 
of legality within which people often attack localised deficiencies of law and the 
inequalities it produces while retaining respect for the legitimacy of law as a whole. 
Numerous examples were found among the participants in this study, often 
reiterating faith in some types of employer to respect the law. Participants who 
tended to display such arcs of rejection followed by dissipating radicalism usually 
rationalized employment law’s barriers and inequalities as localised.  
Doug felt he had not known, or needed to know, much about employment law when 
he had been employed in the public sector. When the Job Centre encouraged him to 
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take a casual job in construction this employment situation became problematic. 
Doug became wary of private sector employment which appeared to him to be 
“dodgy” compared to the public sector: 
I didn’t really know anything because nothing like that had ever happened to me, I 
was always I’ve always worked through like council or local government companies. 
The first time I’ve ever worked for a private company (…) it just put me off the idea 
(…) because they try to make you work for a month and then like kind of not have 
a leg to stand on (…) if something goes wrong. 
Doug worked for around a month without being paid. The employer disappeared 
and Doug struggled to pursue his wages. He complained to the Job Centre for 
placing him with such disreputable employer but felt fobbed-off. Somewhat 
ironically, Doug, was aggrieved by his treatment by the Job Centre (i.e. part of the 
public sector) as well as his employer and the ET system, but localised his course of 
action to avoiding working in the private sector again if possible. Doug, did not wish 
to take any form of alternative or collective action even though he identified that 
many others had suffered the same problem with the employer. Doug said that he 
was not necessarily now more likely to investigate his rights following his 
experience but that, if he was taking a job with a private employer again, he might 
need to do so: 
Well ever since that has happened to me I’m a bit wary o’ stuff but it’s no’ really 
like I’ve not looked up like the law or anything (…) if there was a job coming up and 
if it was with a private company then that’s when I would look into stuff to see if 
anything’s like different scenarios if something went wrong again what rights have I 
got. 
7. Conclusions 
For many people, the system of employment protection rights is failing to meet its 
public aspirations: on its inception, the ET system was presented as an accessible, 
cheap and informal means of resolving disputes at work and achieving justice 
(Donovan Commission 1968). It is debatable whether this vision was ever actually 
achievable and recent reforms have moved reality and aspiration even further 
apart. It is likely that downgraded expectations following the recent withdrawal and 
weakening of many rights, and new barriers to bringing claims will only gradually 
melt into a public legal consciousness of employment protections that is already, at 
best, vague.  
The complexity of the system and difficulty of enforcing rights make it almost 
impenetrable to lay-people, but this lack of access is largely hidden from public 
view in the UK’s privatized system of dispute resolution (Colling 2004). People 
generally only realise the limits of law and of the ET system when they are 
personally confronted by them. All participants in the current study expressed at 
least some hope in using legal remedies, although some in a “gaming” capacity 
compatible with cynical and dissenting dispositions to law. However, there were 
among some participants pre-existing scepticism towards the fairness and authority 
of the law. More often views had hardened after disappointing advice regarding 
legal remedies and rights protections at CAB and/or attempts to use the law.  
Few people proclaim “I’ve been oppressed!”, meaning that we require subtle forms 
of analysis that can lay bare taken-for-granted assumptions about law and legality 
and how robust these are when challenged by experience and new knowledge. 
Exploring consciousness and hegemony can be controversial as they may imply that 
the researcher can discern what the true interests of their participants are. 
However, as noted above, by the use of comparison of individuals’ reactions to 
particular conditions, we may side-step this responsibility and instead explore the 
range of options open to individuals (and collectives) who contemplate them 
(Hyman 1972, Edwards 2006). 
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Public legal consciousness is dominated by a vague faith that employment law will 
be there should a serious work-related problem arise. For participants in this study, 
upon learning of law’s limits, its qualifications, the difficulty of enforcing it, 
criticisms of law tended to be localised or led to cynicism. Reactions to frustrating 
experiences or bad news from advisers tends to lead to cynicism and resignation, 
only very rarely does it lead to dissenting collectivism or challenges to law’s 
hegemony. Litowitz (2000, 541) tells us that hegemony is defined by seeing the 
existing (and worsening) order of things as natural and immutable: 
The lived experience of hegemony consists largely in a series of unreflective actions 
that are not perceived by the individual as submissive; at most, the individual has 
merely a vague sense of injustice and an inarticulate belief that things could be 
better. Hegemony, then, is an extremely common but extremely subtle 
phenomenon. 
Employment law is expected to be there as a form of protection from ill-treatment 
but the boundary around it can be invisible and its impenetrability underestimated, 
like a walled-garden that we think is bright and lush, though we cannot see into it. 
We trust in its beauty because of public pronouncements to this effect, and usually 
have little reason to question this until we seek some of the fruits or blooms it 
contains.  
Dissenting collectives can inspire counter-hegemonic modes of thinking and 
engaging with law. However, potential action may be impossible to galvanise 
among hard-to-reach groups such as unorganised workers seeking the help of CAB 
in work-related grievances, often working in small workplaces without trade unions 
or HR departments, in increasingly common forms of precarious employment.  
Participants in this study very often learned law’s limits and shared sympathetic 
leanings towards trade unionism and collective action. However, there was a 
distinct lack of union presence in their workplaces and in the workplaces they were 
likely to encounter in the future. Trade unions have an image problem which is at 
least partly related to the juxtaposition of the bad old days of loud, aggressive and 
confrontational collective action with the quiet, civilised, sanitized resolution of 
individual rights breaches, done largely in private, behind closed doors. Trade 
unions have been vocal in their opposition to reforms of the ET system such as the 
imposition of fees, with Unison leading the judicial review (see MOJ 2017), but 
perhaps trade unions should be campaigning more strongly to challenge the notion 
that employment law is there for workers who need it. Maybe solidarity would be 
easier to garner if people were disabused of the myth of the unerring strength of 
employment protection rights and the ability of the ET system to deliver justice 
effectively within its current constraints. Recently, the labour movement’s call (now 
formally adopted by the UK Labour Party) is “to shift the focus of labour law from 
statutory minimum rights to collective bargaining, allowing workers to organise and 
negotiate for higher wages and conditions” (Institute for Employment Rights (IER) 
2016).3 This shift and the repositioning of power that it would engender are 
essential to providing any meaningful form of protection for people at work. 
References 
Archer, M., ed., 1998. Critical Realism: Essential Readings. London: Routledge. 
Bacon, N. and Storey, J., 1996. Individualism and Collectivism and the Changing 
Role of Trade Unions. In: P. Ackers, C. Smith, and P. Smith, eds., The New 
Workplace and Trade Unionism. London: Routledge. 
Busby, N. and McDermont, M., 2012. Workers, Marginalised Voices and the 
Employment Tribunal System: Some Preliminary Findings. The Industrial Law 
Journal, 41 (2), 166-83. 
                                                 
3 The authors are grateful to Morag McDermont for making this connection with their argument.  
Eleanor Kirk and Nicole Busby  Led Up the Tribunal Path?… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 7, n. 7 (2017), 1397-1420 
ISSN: 2079-5971 1418 
Busby, N. and McDermont, M., 2016. Access to Justice in the Employment Tribunal: 
Private Disputes or Public Concerns? In: E. Palmer et al., eds., Access to 
Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics of Austerity. London: Hart. 
Busby, N., 2015. Challenging Employment Tribunal Fees: R (Unison) v Lord 
Chancellor and another. Edinburgh Law Review, 19 (2), 254-259.  
Casebourne, J. et al., 2006. Employment Rights at Work – Survey of Employees. 
Employment Relations Research Series [online]. London: Department of Trade 
and Industry. Available from: http://www.employment-
studies.co.uk/system/files/resources/files/errs51.pdf [Accessed 23 March 
2017].  
Colling, T., 2004. No Claim, No Pain? The Privatisation of Dispute Resolution in 
Britain. Economic and Industrial Democracy. 25 (4), 555-579. 
Colling, T., 2009. Court in a Trap? Legal Mobilisation by Trade Unions in the United 
Kingdom. Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations [online], 91. Industrial 
Relations Unit. Coventry: University of Warwick. Available from: 
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/irru/wpir/wpir_91.pdf 
[Accessed 23 March 2017].  
Corby, S. and Latreille, P., 2012. Employment tribunals and the civil courts: 
isomorphism exemplified. Industrial Law Journal, 41 (4), 387-406. 
Corby, S., 2015. British employment tribunals: from the side-lines to centre stage. 
Labor History, 56 (2), 161–179. 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011. Flexible, Effective, Fair: 
Promoting Economic Growth through a Strong Effective Labour Market. 
[online]. London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Available 
from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/32148/11-1308-flexible-effective-fair-labour-market.pdf. [Accessed 23 
March 2017].  
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013. Payment of Tribunal Awards 
[online]. London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Available 
from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/253558/bis-13-1270-enforcement-of-tribunal-awards.pdf [Accessed 23 
March 17].  
Dickens, L., ed., 2012. Making Employment Rights Effective. Oxford: Hart. 
Dickens, L., 2014. The Coalition government’s reforms to employment tribunals and 
statutory employment rights—echoes of the past. Industrial Relations Journal, 
45 (3) 234–249. 
Donovan Commission, 1968. The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations Report (Cmnd 3623). London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office. 
Edwards, P.K., 2006. Power and Ideology in the Workplace: Going Beyond even the 
Second Version of the Three-dimensional View. Work, Employment and 
Society, 20 (3), 57-81  
Employment Rights Act 1996. 
Ewick, P. and Silbey, S., 1998. The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday 
Life. University of Chicago Press. 
Ewing, K. and Hendy, J., 2012. Unfair Dismissal law Changes – Unfair? Industrial 
Law Journal, 41 (1), 115-121. 
Eleanor Kirk and Nicole Busby  Led Up the Tribunal Path?… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 7, n. 7 (2017), 1397-1420 
ISSN: 2079-5971 1419 
Ewing, K., 2011. What today's charter of workers' rights looks like. The Guardian 
[online], 31 January. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jan/31/cable-abuse-
vulnerable-workers [Accessed 8 August 2017]. 
Eyerman, R., 1981. False Consciousness and Ideology in Marist Theory. Acta 
Sociologica, 24 (3), 43-56.  
Genn, H.G., 1999. Paths to Justice. Oxford: Hart.  
Goodman, N., 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. Cambridge, MA: Hackett.  
Gramsci, A., 1999/1947. Selections from the Prison Notebooks [online]. Edited and 
translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith. Transcribed from the edition 
published by Lawrence & Wishart. London: The Electric Book. Available from: 
http://courses.justice.eku.edu/pls330_louis/docs/gramsci-prison-notebooks-
vol1.pdf [Accessed 23 March 2017].  
Halliday, S. and Morgan, B., 2013. I fought the Law and the Law Won. Critical Legal 
Problems, 1-31.  
Health and Safety Executive, 2016. HSE Business Plan 2016/17 [online]. Available 
from: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/strategiesandplans/businessplans/plan1617.p
df [Accessed 23 March 2017]. 
Heery, E., 2011. Debating Employment Law: Responses to Juridification. In: P. 
Blyton, E. Heery and P.J. Turnbull, eds., Reassessing the Employment 
Relationship. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Hepple, B., 2003. Enforcement: The Law and Politics of Cooperation and 
Compliance. In: B. Hepple, ed., Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hepple, B., 2013. Back to the Future: Employment Law under the Coalition 
Government. Industrial Law Journal, 42 (3), 203-223. 
Hyman, R., 1972. Strikes. London: Fontana. 
Institute for Employment Rights, 2016. A Manifesto for Labour Law [online]. 
Liverpool: IER. Available from: http://www.ier.org.uk/manifesto [Accessed 23 
March 2017].  
Kelly, J., 1998. Rethinking Industrial Relation: Mobilization, Collectivism, and Long 
Waves. London: Routledge. 
Kirk, E., 2017. The ‘Problem’ with the Employment Tribunal System: Reform, 
Rhetoric and Realities for the Clients of Citizens Advice Bureaux. Work, 
Employment and Society [online]. Available from: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0950017017701077 [Accessed 
8 August 2017]. 
Litowitz, D., 2000. Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law. Brigham Young University 
Law Review, 2 (1), 515-551. 
Marx and Engels Correspondence, 1968/1893. Engels to Franz Mehring [online], 14 
July. International Publishers. Available from: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1893/letters/93_07_14.htm 
[Accessed 23 March 2017].  
McLoughlin, I. and Gourlay, S., 1990. Enterprise Without Unions: Employment 
Relations in Non‐Union Firms. Management Research News, 13 (6), 12-13. 
Meager, N. et al., 2002. Awareness, knowledge and exercise of individual 
employment rights. Employment Relations Research Series [online]. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. Available from: 
Eleanor Kirk and Nicole Busby  Led Up the Tribunal Path?… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 7, n. 7 (2017), 1397-1420 
ISSN: 2079-5971 1420 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/doc/5082/mrdoc/pdf/5082userguide.pdf [Accessed 23 
March 2017].  
Merry, S.E., 1990. Getting Justice and Getting Even. University of Chicago Press. 
Ministry of Justice, 2017. Review of the introduction of fees in the Employment 
Tribunals Consultation on proposals for reform. [online]. London: Ministry of 
Justice. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-the-introduction-of-
fees-in-the-employment-tribunals [Accessed 23 March 2017]. 
O’Sullivan, M. et al., 2015. Is Individual Employment Law Displacing the Role of 
Trade Unions? Industrial Law Journal, 44 (2), 222-245. 
Pleasance, P., Bamber, N.J. and Denvir, C., 2015. Groundbreaking national survey 
demonstrates worryingly low levels of legal understanding amongst the 
general population in England and Wales. The Legal Education Foundation 
[online]. Available from: 
https://www.thelegaleducationfoundation.org/report/how-people-understand-
and-interact-with-the-law [Accessed 23 March 2017]. 
Pollert, A. and Charlwood, A., 2009. The Vulnerable Worker in Britain and Problems 
at Work. Work Employment and Society, 23 (3), 343-362. 
Pollert, A., 2007. Britain and Individual Employment Rights: Paper Tigers, Fierce in 
Appearance but Missing in Tooth and Claw. Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, 28, 110-139. 
R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) 
[2017] UKSC 51 On appeal from: [2015] EWCA Civ 935. 
Renton, D., 2012. Struck Out. London: Pluto. 
Sarat, A. and Felstiner, W.L.M., 1995. Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Saundry, R. et al., 2014. Reframing Resolution [online]. Acas Discussion Paper. 
London: Arbitration and Conciliation Advisory Service. Available from: 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/6/9/reframing_policy_paper_FINAL.pdf 
[Accessed 23 March 2017].  
Sayer, A., 1992. Method in Social Science. London: Routledge. 
Silbey, S., 2005. After Legal Consciousness. Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, (1) 323-68.  
Smith, P. and Morton, G., 1993. Union Exclusion and the De-Collectivisation of 
Industrial Relations in Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 31 (1), 
97-114.  
Trade Union Act 2016. 
UK Parliament, 2015. Key Issues for Parliament 2015 [online]. Available from: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/key-issues-
parliament-2015/ [Accessed 23 March 2017]. 
University College London Faculty of Laws, 2015. English and Welsh Civil and Social 
Justice Panel Survey: Waves 1-2, 2010-2012 [online]. Data collection. UK 
Data Service. Available from: http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7643-1. 
[Accessed 24 October 2017].  
Webb, S. and Webb, B., 1897. Industrial Democracy. London: Longmans, Green 
and Co. 
Williams, S., 2014. Introducing Employment Relations. Oxford University Press. 
 
